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Retford Currency Society

Market Bosworth Farmers' Association meeting...

London

1851

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Retford Currency Society.

MARKET BOSWORTH FARMERS' ASSOCIATION MEETING,

HELD OCTOBER 2ND, 1850,

AT THE

DIXIE ARMS INN.

Quod dixi dixi.

LONDON:

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, AND CO. STATIONERS' HALL COURT; AND SKEFFINGTON AND CO. 192, PICCADILLY.

AND A METCALFE, RETFORD.

1851.

No. 6. [Second Thousand.

REPORT OF THE MEETING

OF THE

MARKET BOSWORTH FARMERS' ASSOCIATION,

TO CONSIDER

THE CURRENCY,

AS IT AFFECTS THE INTERESTS

OF THE AGRICULTURISTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

FROM THE LEICESTERSHIRE MERCURY.

ON Wednesday, October 2nd, the Market Bosworth Farmers' Association again met, and the attendance of Members was numerous. Mr. Richard Smith, of Sutton Cheney, was called to the chair.

Mr. Needham Gimson moved the first resolution, as follows:—"That the question of the Currency is one which materially affects the Agriculturists of Great Britain, and becomes indispensably necessary to be considered since the principles of Free Trade have been adopted." It might be asked, perhaps, (said Mr. Gimson,) why the Farmers should take up this question; what had they to do with it—and, did they understand it? If they did not understand it, that was because they had not yet studied the question (hear). As to its not affecting them, he would remark that the farmers found, owing to the reduction in the price of agricultural produce, that they were paying £2 for every £1 they were receiving (hear); and they all knew that our present Currency system was based on the Corn Law, which estimated the average price of wheat at 80s. a quarter: that was, no foreign corn should come into this country under 80s. a quarter. He did not mean that the farmers received 80s. a quarter for their corn under that law—(hear)—but that they were *supposed* to be receiving 80s., and that their payments were based on that

supposition (hear, hear, hear). They had now, however, to sell two quarters for that supposed price of one; and that being the case, was it reasonable that the landed interest should be called upon to pay *two* pounds where, before, they only had to pay *one*? (hear, hear). The other day, as he wanted a new coat, he went into a tailor's shop to ask the price of one—he was told 50s. He told the tradesman that money was a scarce commodity with farmers now; but that he would give him a quarter of corn for his coat (laughter). The tailor, however, said No; the principle of barter would not suit him: and so (we understood) the bargain was not struck (hear, hear). These remarks were very general, he was aware; and he refrained from going further into the question, as the Rev. Mr. Twells would shortly address them at length upon the subject. But he (Mr. G.) would beg to remind the meeting that they had a mighty struggle before them, for which they must arm themselves well. They had justice on their side; their arms must be the goose-quill and discussion; and, clothed in a panoply of hope, assurance, and indomitable perseverance, he had no fear of the result (cheers). They had no Corn Tax—they would have no Bank Tax (renewed cheers).

Mr. J. J. Burbury briefly seconded the resolution: after which, the Chairman said he had now the pleasure of calling upon the Rev. John Twells, of Perlethorpe, Nottinghamshire, to express his opinion upon the question now before the meeting.

Mr. Twells then rose and spoke as follows:—In venturing to appear amongst you, I must request your indulgence, both as a stranger and as one whose profession may appear to disqualify him, in some respects, for taking a part in the public discussion of the question which calls us together do-day. I can unaffectedly say, that nothing but an overwhelming sense of the importance of this question to the country in general, and at this time more particularly to the Agricultural Interest, would have induced me, here or elsewhere, to have come forward as I am now doing (hear). Yes, gentlemen, it is a deeply-rooted conviction of many years' standing, founded on a deliberate and impartial consideration of this question, and an attentive observation of the facts of the case for the last thirty years, which has induced numbers of thinking men—arguing from the experience of what has happened in this country, to abstract principles as to the *causes* of what they have witnessed—to devote their time and energies to this little-understood question:—because we believe that the interests of all, rich and poor, manufacturers and agriculturists, are so deeply involved in it, that permanent prosperity can *never* (under any circumstances) be secured, till we have a thorough reform of the present Monetary System established by Peel's Bills of 1819 and 1844 (cheers).

The resolution, which will be put from the Chair for your adoption or rejection, declares "That the Question of the Currency is one which materially affects the Agriculturists of Great Britain." And with respect to the importance of the question to the agriculturists, and all other classes, I beg to call your attention to the opinion of the late Sir Robert Peel, in his speech of May 6, 1844, on the Bank Charter Bill. Speaking of his Currency Bill, he says,—"There is no contract, public or private, no engagement, national or individual, which is unaffected by it. The enterprises of commerce, the profits of trade, the arrangements to be made in all the domestic relations of society, the wages of labour, the transactions of the highest amount, and of the lowest, the payment of the national debt, the provision for the national expenditure on the one hand, and the command which the coin of the smallest denomination has over the necessaries of life on the other, are all affected by the decision to which we may come on that great question which I am about to submit to the consideration of the committee." With this comprehensive and well-expressed statement of Sir Robert Peel I entirely agree. *Money* is one-half of every bargain made between man and man. In early times, all traffic was a matter of *barter*. Each man bartered the superfluity of what he possessed, for that which he desired to possess. But it soon became requisite to have something for which all should be willing to exchange commodities. That something was called *Money*. In different countries, various commodities have been considered money; but the precious metals, as they are called, Gold and Silver, have, from their portability and durability, been generally adopted for that purpose. One of the earliest instances on record of a precious metal being a medium of exchange is that of Abraham, with which you are all familiar. Abraham bought the field of Machpelah, of Ephron the Hittite, the son of Zohar, for four hundred sheckels of silver. This silver was "current with the merchant," but

it was not *coin*. "Abraham *weighed* to Ephron the silver." The word *sheckel* comes from the Hebrew *shackal*, to *weigh*. Calmet affirms that the Hebrews had no coined money until Antiochus Sidetes, King of Syria, granted to Judas Maccabæus the privilege of coining money in Judœa. Now the value of any commodity—Corn, for instance—would depend on two things: the supply and demand of corn, and the supply and demand of silver. And here you will, I think, begin to see clearly how the Currency Question affects your interests. The farmer is a manufacturer, so to speak, of corn and cattle. He takes the superfluity of his corn and cattle to market, and with them *buys money*. He *must* possess himself of money, for money is the only legal tender for his rent, his taxes, and his debts. And hence the farmers seem to me to have been much mistaken as to their interests, when they directed their attention solely to the laws which were made about Corn, and entirely neglected those which were made about Money (hear). They ought to have attended to the laws made about both (hear, hear); for their interests are as much affected by the laws made respecting what they buy, viz. Money, as by those made about what they sell, viz. Corn. In 1826, Sir James Graham, in his *Corn and Currency*, said, "The value "of money is in the inverse ratio of its quantity; the supply "of *commodities* remaining the same, increase the quantity of "money, prices rise; decrease the quantity of money, prices "fall. On the other hand, the quantity of *money* remaining "the same, increase the quantity of commodities, prices fall; "decrease the quantity of commodities, prices rise." I will endeavour to make this, if possible, still plainer, because this should be well understood. I adopt, then, Mr. Mills' illustration. Suppose there are 100 loaves, and 100 shillings to exchange for them; each loaf would command a shilling. The loaves remaining 100, increase the shillings to 200, and each loaf would command *two* shillings: decrease the number of shillings to 50, and each loaf would then command only *sixpence*. On the other hand, the number of shillings remaining 100, increase the loaves to 200, and each shilling would command *two* loaves: decrease the loaves to 50, and it would then take *two* shillings to buy *one* loaf (hear, hear). Here, then, is the common sense view of the Currency Question. If the quantity of money in circulation be increased, the harvest being an average one, corn rises:—if the quantity of money be decreased, prices fall. A very bad or deficient harvest, is an exceptional case; Corn then rises to a famine-price, from the scarceness of the commodity, as, with a very abundant harvest, it falls from the plentifulness of the gifts of Providence (hear.)

How, then, do *facts* bear out this theory of common sense? There have been two periods of a great increase of money. One, in the time of Queen Elizabeth, from the discovery of the American mines; the other when Mr. Pitt carried out the system of a Paper Currency. What was the effect of the increase of the circulating medium in Elizabeth's time? From 1499 to 1560 the price of wheat was 10s. and 5-12ths a quarter; from 1561 to 1601 wheat was 47s. $5\frac{1}{8}$d. a quarter (hear). What was the cause of this enormous rise? "The "discovery of the abundant mines in America," says Adam Smith, "seems to have been the sole cause of this diminution "in the value of silver in proportion to that of corn. It is "accounted for, accordingly, in the same manner by every-"body; and there has never been any dispute, either about "the fact, or about the cause of it." How few things are there about which Adam Smith, or any other man, could say, and say truly, "there never has been any dispute!" (hear). Look, next, at the still greater increase of the circulating medium which took place in Pitt's time. What was the state of the country in 1797—the period of the Bank Restriction Act? After a long and expensive struggle with our American Colonies, and being at war with France, the gold and silver of the country was nearly all drained away. The Bank could no longer pay its notes in gold, and afford assistance to Government. Our gold and silver was exhausted: but were we therefore *poor?* No, the real wealth—the land, the mines, the houses, the workshops of the world—remained (hear.) Our ships covered the seas, bearing away the produce of our looms and mills, to exchange for the riches of every clime, And, above all, our country was full of MEN (cheers)—of an industrious, energetic, and persevering population—a bold Anglo-Saxon race, with stout hearts and willing hands, equal to all emergencies, and prepared to encounter and overcome any difficulties. These constitute the *real wealth* of a nation (cheers).

And what did Pitt's measures do? Why they provided a representative for all this real wealth. A Paper Money which

might distribute commodities—might enable men to exchange the productions of their industry, to buy and sell, to pay rents, taxes, and debts--in a word, to discharge, as the Bank Notes *did* discharge, all the functions of money (hear).—Every sovereign we have in this country we have *bought* with our goods. So it was then; while the Paper Money was circulating at home, our merchants were exchanging their goods for other commodities, and gold and silver among other things, abroad; and this gold and silver were sold to Government, and with it our troops were paid, and foreign powers subsidized (hear). Under this system the country flourished, in spite of War and all its attendant evils. I say "in *spite* of War." For I adopt the opinion of a man who has been a warrior from his youth up—the Duke of Wellington—in calling war "the greatest of all evils" (loud cheers). Morally, socially, and politically, War is the most dreadful scourge which Providence has permitted to visit the earth (renewed cheering). This country felt, and felt severely at times, the evils of war. The closing of ports and markets by French influence was an evil. The seizure of ten millions of property belonging to British merchants in the Baltic ports, caused much distress. The refusal of the Americans to take our goods—of which £7,000,000. annually were sold in the States—inflicted much suffering on our manufacturing districts. Still, we spent much in war—we lent large sums to Government—we paid heavy taxes—and the nation progressed and prospered (hear). The reason of this was, that an adequate and abundant circulating medium was provided. In 1797, the Bank Notes in circulation were £8,601,964.; in 1807, the circulation was £16,724,368. —or nearly *double*; in 1814, it was £28,291,832. or more than *three times* as much as in 1797 (hear). With this increase in money, prices rose. The Committee of the House of Commons reported in 1815, that the price of wheat in this country, on an average of 5 years, had never exceeded 50s. a quarter. But the average price of wheat from 1794 to 1820 was 87s. 10d. a qr. and from 1809 to 1820, 98s. 9d. a qr. And observe —there was NO PROTECTION then (hear, hear). We were then a *corn importing* country, and land was constantly being brought into cultivation. Porter states that, from 1797 to 1816, no less than 1779 Inclosure Bills passed. We had also fewer mouths to feed. The population of Great Britain, according to Mr. McCulloch was in 1801, 10,943,000--while

in 1848 it was 21,000,000 (hear). But it may be said that this was a "fictitious price"—that it was only a paper-money price. But, in a highly taxed country like ours, the price, to be remunerative, must be comparatively high; for this reason—that the farmer, and every producer, to get a remunerative price, ought to be able to add the amount of taxation to the cost of production (hear). If you can produce any article at a cost represented by 4, and an amount equal to 2 be added by taxation, your price must become 6 to make it remunerative (hear).

But high prices, as was before said, can only exist with an abundant circulating medium. The system of paper money, in operation during the war, supplied this abundant circulation; and therefore enabled the country to bear its heavy burdens, and to prosper in spite of them (hear, hear). What happened when our efforts were at last crowned with an universal peace? The nation's rejoicings were scarcely over, before a period commenced of dreadful distress (hear). How was this brought about? Immediately after peace was proclaimed, the Bank was informed that its notes must be paid in gold at a fixed price (viz. £3. 17s. 10½d. an oz.) Accordingly the Bank proceeded forthwith to draw in its notes. The circulation, which, according to Mr. Loyd, was at its highest in 1813 and 1814, was diminished nearly one half in 1816 and 1817. The country bankers were forced to do the same. Prices declined immediately—ruin followed. In March, 1815, the Corn Law passed which *was* to secure the farmer 80s. a quarter for his wheat; in the following December, the monthly average was 55s. 9d. a quarter, or 30 per cent. less than the law of March had fixed as a remunerative price (hear, hear). The distress of 1816 was terrific. This is the description of it given in January, 1817, by Mr. Tierney:—"Each succeeding year since the war ended" said he, "has only made things worse; "the distress, at first confined principally to our agriculture, "has spread to every branch of trade and industry, *and the "national misery has reached a point wholly without a precedent "since the Norman Conquest"* (hear). The people were aghast, and asked the cause of all this. They were told by their rulers that it was *the sudden transition from war to peace* which was ruining the country (hear)! How was this distress removed? That question was answered by the Bank Directors in their evidence before the committee of 1819: "Was not

1816," it was asked, "a period of very considerable commercial and agricultural distress?" "Very great indeed," answered Mr. Harman. "Did not that distress render it necessary to relieve the public by an increased issue of bank notes?" "Yes." "Were not the advances made in that year by the Bank to Government, a great instrument of relieving the distress you have spoken of, by affording more plentiful circulation?" "*Yes; inasmuch as they made money plentiful.*" Money was made *plentiful*, and the distress vanished (hear). But Government persevered in urging on cash payments. Peel made his *first* public change of opinion, and came out of the committee of 1819 a bullionist. In January, 1819, the country had fully recovered from its prostration. The Prince Regent told Parliament that he had the "greatest "satisfaction in being able to inform them that the trade, "commerce, and manufactures of the country, were in a most "flourishing condition. The average price of wheat for 1818 was 84s. a quarter; agriculture was therefore also flourishing. The revenue of the country, without a new tax, increased in 1818 no less than £4,700,000. Peel's bill passed on July 2, 1819. The consequences of that measure shall be described to you by Mr. Matthias Attwood. In a speech delivered by him on June 8, 1830,—(which contains, I venture to affirm, more statesmanlike principles, more profound and sagacious views on monetary science than any speech delivered on this subject in either of the Houses of Parliament)—in that speech he says, "That Act fell on the calm prosperity and labours of "the people—on the prosperous industry of the country—to "confound, and disorder, and destroy. All the calamities of "1816 were renewed. The blow was first felt by the "manufacturing population. Without employment—without "wages—without the means of subsistence; *suffering from "artificial famine in the midst of plenty*—ignorant from whence "the blow came, by thousands and tens of thousands the "manufacturing population prepared for resistance." In November of the same year, Parliament was called together again. The Prince Regent thus addressed them. "I have observed." he said, "with great concern, the attempts made in some of "the manufacturing districts to take advantage of local distress "to excite disaffection to the institutions and government of "the country. A spirit is now fully manifested, utterly hostile to the constitution of this kingdom, and aiming, not only

"at the change of those political institutions which have "hitherto constituted the pride and security of this country, "but at the subversion of the rights of property, and of all "order in society." The Luddites at this time destroyed machinery, to which they attributed their sufferings—riots broke out in Lancashire—the farmers suffered next—thousands were entirely ruined (hear)—wheat went down to 64s. a qr.—incendiary fires spread throughout the rural districts (hear). The Habeas Corpus Act was suspended—and a special commission sent out to try, condemn, and execute the rioters and rick burners (hear). The distress continued; in 1820 wheat was sold at 53s. 11d. a quarter, in 1821 at 46s. 2d. a quarter, and in 1822 at 38s. 1d a quarter (true). Remember there was *no free trade then* (hear). The agriculturists were told that their distress *now* arose from *over production* (hear and laughter)—Providence has been too bountiful, and their crops too good (hear). Again money was made plentiful. Lord Londonderry's Small Note Act, allowing £1 and £2 notes, passed. By loans to government, loans to the landed interest, loans on public works, money was forced into circulation. Four millions were thus added to the circulation. The country revived. Mr. Tooke says that the circulating medium altogether became 50 per cent. greater in 1825 than it had been in 1823. The King, in his speech, said "There never "was a period in the history of the country when *all* the in-"terests of society were, at the same time, in so flourishing a "condition." Prices rose; it became more profitable to the foreigner to take our gold than our goods, and by the end of 1825, scarcely a sovereign was left in the Bank. The circulation was therefore rapidly contracted, by the Bank withdrawing its issues, and in December, 1825, broke out the Panic (hear). The blow fell first on the bankers. One-eighth part of the country banks in England, and six of the London banks, stopped payment. They were told that they deserved their ruin:—it arose from *over-issue of notes*—(hear)—that over-issue which, if it existed, Government had done everything in their power to encourage. The traders and manufacturers of the country speedily felt the ill effects of the panic of 1825. They were told that their sufferings arose from an *over production* of commodities. They had worked too hard, risen too early, been too ingenious in increasing the produce of their industry (hear and laughter). Yet the poor in the

manufacturing districts were starving "with food in abundance staring them in the face," says Mr. Francis; and two hundred families were officially declared to have among them only four blankets. The country continued to suffer (hear). The agricultural distress of 1829 and 1830 was most extreme, and the House of Commons was assailed with petitions from all parts, and from all interests, which even now cannot be read without shrinking from the details of the misery which they record.

In 1832 occurred another panic, though less severe than that of 1825. The Reform Bill, which distress had driven the people to demand, brought no relief. In 1834 wheat was sold for 41s. 5d., in 1835 for 36s. 8d., and in 1836 for 36s. a quarter:—still, *no Free Trade*, wheat being *protected* up to 70s. a quarter (hear). In 1837 came a panic again, and in 1839 the Bank had to borrow 2½ millions of specie from the Bank of France to escape bankruptcy (hear).

Government, in 1843, propounded the doctrine, that *Indirect Taxation had reached its limit*. The Whigs went out, leaving a deficit, the effect of bad money-laws, of £10,072,638, and Peel again came into office and imposed the Income Tax. In 1844 Peel introduced his Bank Charter Bill, in doing which he said that "during the last 20 years, four decisive proofs, at "four distinct periods, had been given, viz in 1825, 1832, "1837, and 1839, that under the present system of Currency the principle of Convertibility is endangered." This was the condemnation of his Bill of 1819 by himself. He therefore proposed to take "effectual measures"—the matured wisdom of Bullionism—to prevent such evils recurring. Mr. Goulburn called this measure "a perfect system" (hear, hear!) In October 1847, came another dreadful panic, in which the Bank was only saved from stopping payment by the interference of the Government.—The late Lord Ashburton therefore justly called the Bill of 1844 "a great experiment which had *signally failed*" (hear).

Gentlemen, I have entered into these details to show to you the repeated *proofs* which we have had of the imperfection of our Monetary System; to show how this country has been forced for the last thirty years to alternate between prosperity and distress—and to make it plain that, whenever we have had an adequate circulating medium, prices have risen to a remunerative level and we have enjoyed prosperity; and that

whenever Peel's system has come into active operation, and the circulation has been contracted, *forced cheapness* has resulted, and distress, misery, and ruin have pervaded all classes (hear, hear, and cheers).

But it were useless to point out these evils, unless we could also point out their *remedy*. This can be done. The great evil of the present system is the *fixed price of gold* (hear). The obligation on the Bank to buy gold when it does not want it, and to sell it when there is a drain, causes the arbitrary expansions and contractions of the Currency. With gold at its market-price, the country flourished during the War, and would again do so. Paper-money, in which gold might rise and fall in price, and which should be a legal tender for all pecuniary obligations, might be provided in sufficient amount, and made perfectly secure. There are various ways in which this might be done. Pitt effected it by a Bank Restriction Act. I proposed a simple method some time since, which might, with ease and facility, be adopted, viz. to release the Bank from its obligation to buy gold when it had a certain sum, say 14 millions, of specie in its coffers, and also to remove the restriction of *never* issuing beyond the sum of 14 millions on securities. In the event of a drain of gold, I would allow the Bank to issue notes beyond this limit, on securities, and not only, as is now the case, on the gold locked up in the issue department. Thus, when gold leaves the country, the void created in the circulation would be immediately supplied by bank-notes (hear).

But perhaps no plan has commended itself so generally as the one proposed by Mr. John Taylor, of London, a gentleman who has thoroughly mastered the question, and has philosophically examined and elucidated it. He proposes that a National Paper Money should be issued, of £1 notes and upwards, which issue should never exceed in a year the amount of the annual taxation. This money paid away by government for the salaries of its officers, for the dividends, and for all expenses, would be a legal tender, and being receivable for taxes would never be either in excess, nor liable to depreciation. As the penny postage-stamps collect the whole revenue of the Post-office, so would this money collect the whole revenue of the nation (hear). The arrangement of this plan would be matter of detail, and presents no real difficulties. As to private banks and banking companies, I would

interfere as little as possible with them—only taking care to make their issues as secure as possible, that so the currency of the nation might be rendered as perfectly safe as *gold* itself (hear). Thus with a paper-money system similar to that which we had during the war, but *better*—improved by all the suggestions which experience and philosophy can present—is it possible not to see that the prosperity and happiness of this country might be increased to an extent scarcely yet contemplated? (hear).

We can tell *how* this Currency would increase the nation's wealth:—

I.—It would replace a very expensive medium of exchange—GOLD, by a very cheap one—PAPER. The fifty or sixty millions of gold which are now supposed to be in circulation, and which are merely used as counters, would be then replaced by notes. Here at once would be a saving of more than two millions a-year, by converting this large amount of dead stock into active, productive stock (hear). Suppose a farmer had been taught that it was necessary to use a golden ploughshare worth £1000, and a man came and said, "I will "make for you a ploughshare of iron for 100 pence, which will "do the work just as well:"—it is plain that the farmer would have the difference between £1000 and 100 pence to employ as *active* capital (hear). He could improve his land, drain, manure, and what not, when he had substituted a cheap ploughshare for a dear one (hear, hear). Lord Liverpool's wisdom led him to a contrary opinion, when he advocated the introduction of the present system, "The richest standard, "*Gold*," said he, "is best adapted for a rich country." The country was prospering with, and by, cheap money. "Adopt "an expensive money," said Lord Liverpool, "Plough your "land with a golden ploughshare." We did so, and threw aside an inexpensive and tried instrument merely to adopt a fanciful theory (hear, hear, and cheers).

II.—But we say that a representative Paper Currency would benefit the nation by rendering our circulating medium independent of the foreign exchanges. When gold flows into the country, the Bank increases its issues, for it is forced to buy gold at a fixed price, with its paper. The rate of interest is lowered, and speculation is forced upon the people, from the difficulty of obtaining a profitable investment for capital, When gold goes out of the country, the Bank contracts its issues, for it is liable to pay its notes in gold at £3. 17s. 10½d. an ounce. Hence money becomes exceedingly scarce, interest rises enormously, prices fall, trade is paralysed, hoarding begins, panic ensues, and distress and ruin, as in 1825, 1832, 1837, 1839, and 1847, follow (hear). The effect of the panic of 1825 is thus described by Sir James Graham in his *Corn and Currency:* "Commerce is stagnated, "manufactures suspended; masters are without money, and "men without employment; and ruin and insurrection stalk "throughout the land." "I believe," said Mr. Cobden, in his evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, "greater evils have been occasioned to the trade and manu- "factures of the country in 1836 and 1837, and the subse- "quent periods, by the fluctuations in the currency; greater "evils—pecuniary, social, and moral—than by the direct "failures of all the banks of issue since they were first "established in the country" (hear). The Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1836 declared that the loss on cotton, wool, silk, linen, and hardware, amounted to forty millions through the Currency Laws. In 1847, the loss to the country, as stated by Mr. Richard Spooner in the House of Commons, was upwards of 250 millions. These ruinous fluctuations and panics would be obviated under a well regulated Currency (hear, hear).

III.—But the most important advantage of a Representative Paper Currency is this,—that we should obtain a circulating medium capable of expansion, a money in which prices would be able to rise as taxes are imposed, so that taxes might be added to the cost of production, and a remunerative price be obtained (hear). And further, as our population increased, and our commodities increased also—in other words, as our buyers and sellers increased, and the things to be bought and sold increased—money, the medium of exchange between man and man, might increase in due proportion. People sometimes ask me why the law which governs—or which *ought* to govern—the Currency, cannot be discovered? It *is* discovered. "Supply and demand," I say, "is the law of the Currency." As men increase, more food is required, and more clothes are required; and if left to itself, the supply will increase with the demand. So it is with Money. Make Paper Money as *safe* as you please—make it as safe and secure as gold itself; and this we can prove can be done—and then

leave the trade in money free. Leave it to the general, the universal law of trade, viz., Supply and Demand (hear, hear).

I say, that experience fully justifies the expectations of an improved state of things resulting from an alteration of the Currency Laws. I say that the Paper Money System which enabled this country to prosper in spite of war, would produce tenfold advantages in a time of peace (hear). Observe, I do *not* say that Paper Money would do every thing. I do *not* say, for instance, that it would enable a farmer to prosper without skill, labour, judgment, and a fair amount of capital (hear). I do *not* say that it would supply the place of science and of knowledge in the direction of a man's energies. I know that under any financial system, vice, improvidence, and ignorance will bear their pernicious fruits. But I *do* say that it would secure to labour its just reward; that it would afford to every man of integrity, talent, and energy, a fair opportunity of improving his condition; that it would prevent the attempts which are made for raising the condition of the people from being counteracted by the frequent recurrence of those periods of severe distress and privation in which their moral condition inevitably deteriorates (cheers). I say that the Paper Money System which enabled this country to lend to Government 600 millions, would enable the country to pay off the debt, and thus cause a reduction of nearly 30 millions of taxes. I believe that this country might then advance to a greater height of happiness and prosperity than ever—that instead of disunion and ill-will, we might see all classes flourishing, and contributing to each other's prosperity; that the well-being of the poor would furnish the best security for the possessions of the rich; that men would learn to prize the institutions under which they live happily; and that England would become the instrument, in the hand of Providence, of civilizing, elevating, and christianizing the whole world (loud cheers).

But, gentlemen, I must apologize for taking so wide a range, as well as for intruding thus long on your attention (no, no, and cheers). I thank you very sincerely for the patient and indulgent hearing which you have afforded me, and I commend this important subject to your examination and consideration.—The statements I have made are open to investigation: I submit them to your inquiry. *Quod dixi dixi* (cheers). Discussion is the best friend of truth (cheers).

I wish the subject to be fairly examined into. We have no party, no class interest, to serve: "For each and for all," is our motto (cheers). To extend commercial enterprize—to restore to Agriculture its just remuneration—to ensure to the rich the safe enjoyment of their abundance, and to the poor man the just reward of his labour—*this* is our object (cheers). I advocate the Currency Question, in a word, because I wish to promote the greatest possible happiness of the greatest number, with the least possible injury to the least possible number (loud cheers). And the success of this great question is a matter only of *time*. Sooner or later, it will prevail. But we must all, in our day and generation, do our part: for the inscrutable decrees of Providence ordain, that every great and good cause by which the happiness of our fellow-creatures has to be promoted, must, under the blessing of heaven, be worked out by the persevering energy of *man himself* (loud and general applause).

The resolution was carried unanimously.

The second resolution, proposed by a member of the association, and seconded by Mr. Arthur Brickwell, was as follows:—"That this meeting is of opinion that the farmers of Great Britain must look to an alteration of the laws of the Currency, as one just means of relieving them from their present state of depression; and they therefore direct the Committee of the Society to take steps for obtaining a revision of the present monetary system established by Peel's bill of 1819 and 1844."—Carried unanimously.

Mr. H. Chamberlin moved, and Mr. W. Harrison seconded, a vote of thanks to Mr. Twells for his able and eloquent address.—Mr. Harrison observed that this was not the first time they had met in that room, and that more than once, during their discussion on other topics, some of them had expressed their opinion that the existing Currency System had a great deal to do with the present position of the farmer (hear). For himself, he did not think they would ever get their rents reduced to their proper level, until the Currency Laws were reformed (hear). Mr. H. then rapidly gave a sketch of his own experience as to the extraordinary fluctuations in the price of stock as well as produce, which had taken place concurrently with the various alterations in the Bank issues and restrictions of issue since 1819-20, and after strongly repeating his conviction of the necessity of the Cur-

rency Reform Movement being vigorously pushed onward, said the question having thus been once formally mooted among them, he trusted that it would not be allowed to drop (hear, hear). They must look on this as only a preliminary meeting. They must get further information; and they must discuss it again and again, to see whether they were right in their views or not, though they would not always be as fortunate as they had been that evening in securing the assistance of so able an expositor as Mr. TWELLS (hear, hear). Truth, however, was truth; truth and justice only had been advocated in that Association; and so long as their body held together, he believed they would be advocated there (cheers).

Mr. TWELLS briefly replied, and added that it gave him great pleasure to visit so practical an association as that at Market Bosworth.

After a vote of thanks to Mr. Harrison, for the incessant interest he took in the prosperity of the Association, and for introducing Mr. TWELLS; and to the Chairman for again presiding, the meeting—the interest of which was kept up to the very last—separated about half-past six o'clock.

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